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Bidder Earnings Forecasts in Mergers and Acquisitions 
 
 
Abstract 
This study finds that pro-forma earnings forecasts by bidding firms during acquisitions are associated with 
a higher likelihood of deal completion, expedited deal closing, and with a lower acquisition premium − but 
only in stock-financed acquisitions. Analysts also respond to these forecasts by revising their forecasts for 
the bidder upward. However, the benefits of forecast disclosure only accrue to bidders with a strong 
forecasting reputation prior to the acquisition. Explaining why not all bidders forecast, we document a 
higher likelihood of post-merger litigation and CEO turnover for bidders with a weak forecasting reputation 
and for those that underperform post-merger. 
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1. Introduction 
Acquisition offers involve important and complex decisions by shareholders of the target firm 
whether to give up control over their firm and at what price. In cash offers there is no uncertainty 
about the value the target shareholders are offered––if the deal closes, they walk away with cash. 
If offered the acquirer’s shares, however, the value target shareholders receive is tied to the value 
of the acquirer and thus to (expectations of) the post-acquisition success of the deal. From the 
bidders’ perspectives, on the other hand, the overpayment costs are lower in stock-financed bids as 
they share the uncertainty associated with the success of the acquisition with the target 
shareholders. However, the probability that the bid will fail is higher because target shareholders 
will have to be persuaded of accepting the bidder’s shares (Betton et al. 2009; Amel-Zadeh and 
Zhang 2015; Huang et al. 2016). Accordingly, in this paper we examine whether bidding firms 
disclose pro-forma earnings forecasts for the combined firm, which we label merger forecasts, to 
convince target shareholders in stock-financed acquisitions of the benefits of the proposed deal.1 
Prior evidence suggests that managers are motivated to increase their communication with 
their own shareholders before and during security issuances in general (Clarkson et al. 1991; Healy 
et al. 1999; Lang and Lundholm 2000) and during stock-for-stock acquisitions in particular 
(Kimborough and Louis 2011) to benefit from the well-documented positive effects of increased 
disclosure on the cost of capital (e.g. Leuz and Verrecchia 2000). In acquisitions financed with 
stock, significant information asymmetries exist not only between acquiring managers and their 
own shareholders, but also between the acquiring firm and target shareholders who need to decide 
                                                          
1 Pro-forma earnings forecasts by bidding firms during acquisitions provide an assessment of the future earnings 
potential of the combined firm. They predict whether the acquisition will add (i.e., be accretive to) or detract from 
(i.e., be dilutive to) future EPS. We will refer to these forecasts as merger forecasts throughout the paper. These 
forecasts are distinct from regular earnings guidance that the acquirer might issue for the standalone firm before an 
acquisition announcement. See for example, in investor presentations of the MB Financial-MidCity Financial Corp 
merger in 2002 or more recently of BAT’s acquisition of Reynolds in 2017 (available at http://media.corporate-
ir.net/media_files/irol/11/117839/reports/042001.pdf and 
http://www.bat.com/group/sites/uk__9d9kcy.nsf/vwPagesWebLive/DOAJSMBP/$FILE/medMDAHPCAP.pdf?open
element, respectively) (last accessed 9 April 2018). 
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whether to accept the acquiring firm’s shares. This will be particularly important to target 
shareholders when the bidder’s stock is highly valued, which a stock offer usually signals (Shleifer 
and Vishny 2003; Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan 2004; Di Giuli 2013).2 The literature also 
suggests that, in stock bids, the past record of the bidder may previously have been flattered by 
earnings management (Erikson and Wang 1999; Botsari and Meeks 2008; Botsari and Meeks 
2018). As the vast majority of stock-for-stock and mixed payment deals in the US have a fixed 
exchange ratio (Gaughan 2011; Ahern and Sosyura 2014), the actual value target shareholders 
receive will only be determined upon completion of the deal based on the prevailing share price of 
the acquirer.3 Thus, potentially overvalued bidder shares will be a concern for target shareholders 
due to the risk that the bidder’s offer announcement leads to a revaluation before the completion 
date.  
The prior literature on acquisitions suggests that the revaluation risk can be substantial. 
Incumbent shareholders react significantly more negatively to acquisitions with stock than to 
acquisitions financed with cash due to the negative signaling effect (e.g., Asquith 1983; 
Schlingemann 2004). Moeller et al. (2004), for example, find that acquiring firms’ shareholders 
lose on average $25 million in acquisitions, and significantly more in large stock-financed deals. 
Further confirming the risk to target shareholders, we find that the cumulative abnormal return for 
bidders in our sample between announcement and completion is -8.4%.   
The need to reassure investors that the acquisition will be beneficial becomes even more 
important in light of a large body of evidence that indicates that acquisitions with stock are on 
                                                          
2 Instead of demanding cash, target shareholders can in principle turn the bidder’s stock into cash immediately after 
deal completion. However, they will not only require reassurance from the bidder that the expected return from 
holding shares in the combined firm beyond the completion date compensates for the risks, but will also consider all 
available information when assessing the risk of a revaluation of the bidder’s shares before the completion date. 
3 In stock acquisitions with a floating exchange ratio the share price of the acquirer is equally important to the target. 
Although the value the target shareholders receive is predetermined in these cases, the percentage of ownership is 
only known upon completion of the deal when the actual number of shares they will receive is determined based on 
the prevailing share price of the acquirer.  
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average detrimental also to long-term shareholders (Loughran and Vijh 1997; Moeller, 
Schlingemann and Stulz 2004; Bouwman, Fuller and Nain 2009; Gu and Lev 2011; Fu, Lin and 
Officer, 2013).4  As a consequence, merger forecasts in stock-financed acquisitions not only reduce 
the risk of a revaluation of the bidder’s in the short-term, but also serve as an important signal to 
target shareholders that receiving the bidder’s shares will be beneficial in the long-term. Therefore, 
the bidding firm has special incentives to disclose merger forecasts in stock-financed acquisitions 
to signal to their own and target shareholders the benefits of holding shares in the combined firm.  
This signaling role is likely more important for merger forecasts than synergy estimates.5 
The prior literature on synergy disclosures generally finds that synergy estimates are positively 
associated with the bidder’s and target’s market reaction at announcement (Houston, James and 
Ryngaert 2001; Bernile and Baugess 2011; Dutordoir, Roosenboom, and Vasconcelos 2014), but 
there is also some evidence that synergy estimates are overly optimistic and difficult to verify ex-
post (Bernile and Baugess 2011). In contrast, (quantitative) merger forecasts are easily verifiable 
ex-post and use metrics that are defined by accounting standards and are audited. They might thus 
serve as a more powerful means to convince investors of the benefits of the deal as they are a more 
costly signal than simply disclosing expected synergies. Consistent with the cheap-talk 
characteristics of synergy estimates Dutordoir et al. (2014) find little evidence that these estimates 
have any impact on merger outcomes such as merger premia. 
                                                          
4 Professional consultants equally report that the majority of acquisitions are detrimental to shareholders. For 
example, a report by McKinsey concludes that “Anyone who has researched merger success rates knows that roughly 
70% fail.” (McKinsey 2010). 
5 In addition to merger forecasts bidders also often disclose synergy estimates for the proposed deal at announcement 
of the acquisition. In our sample, about 54% (75%) of bidders that disclose (quantitative) forecasts also disclose 
synergy estimates. Shareholders also receive an abundance of other, mostly historical, information relating to the 
merging firms in the official merger documents filed with the SEC in the days after the acquisition announcement. 
For example, shareholders receive past financial statement information of the two stand-alone firms, pro-forma 
financial statements, a discussion of the strategic rationale for the merger, the deal terms as well as other information 
about the pending deal on Schedule 14A, on Schedule 14C or in Form S4. 
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In addition to being unverifiable, synergies do not guarantee that an acquisition is value-
enhancing for long-term shareholders if the acquirer overpays for the synergies. In contrast, pro-
forma earnings per share forecasts take into account the purchase price and method of payment  
when assessing whether the deal will be accretive or dilutive to the bidder’s stand-alone earnings 
per share. Consequently, the accretion or dilution of the bidder’s earnings per share serves as a first 
signal to investors whether the expected synergies from the acquisition warrant the premium paid. 
Consistent with this notion, anecdotal evidence from the press, practitioners and investor 
presentations suggests that analysts and investors particularly focus on merger forecasts and EPS 
accretion/dilution as a quick metric to assess whether the acquisition creates value.6 In this respect, 
even a qualitative forecast such as simply predicting whether the acquisition will be accretive to 
earnings per share might reassure investors that the deal is more likely to be value enhancing. 
 In sum, acquiring firm managers are motivated to increase public disclosure about the 
future benefits of the proposed acquisition in order to reduce information asymmetries and to 
mitigate agency costs (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Grossman and Hart 1980; Myers and Majluf 
1984).7 However, when forecasts are costly, managers who possess private information about the 
acquisition will only predict merger consequences when the benefits of such voluntary disclosure 
                                                          
6 See for example Wasserstein (1998): “With many investors focused on earnings, companies often hesitate to take 
on dilutive transactions.”; “…accretion/dilution analysis has historically been the sine qua non of investor 
presentations, sell-side research reports, board books, and junior banker job interviews”, FT Alphaville, May 12 
2015, available at https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2015/05/12/2128664/accretiondelusion-analysis-2/ (last accessed 9 April 
2018); Harding and Yale (2002). See also the prominently featured merger forecasts in the investor presentations 
referred to in footnote 1.  
7 Both shareholder groups could in principle be informed privately by their management about the benefits of the 
proposed deal. However, Regulation FD explicitly prohibits selective disclosure of material nonpublic information in 
relation to mergers and acquisitions and requires insiders to make simultaneous announcements to the market if such 
information has been disclosed privately. Specifically, Regulation FD, effective from October 2000, prohibits 
selective disclosure of material nonpublic information during cash or securities offerings made in connection with 
business combinations and explicitly mentions earnings forecasts (17 CFR Parts 240, 243 and 249; 17 CFR 230.415). 
See also legal interpretations in Cooley, Regulation FD: Fair Disclosure, 
https://www.cooley.com/~/media/cooley/pdf/pg-guide-handbook/reg-fd-guide-june-2016.ashx?la=en  (last accessed 
9 April 2018) and in Weil, Gotshal & Manges, M&A Transactions in a Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Environment, 
https://www.weil.com/~/media/files/pdfs/WeilAlert_10-1-04_MA-PostSOXA.pdf (last accessed 9 April 2018). 
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outweigh the costs (Verrecchia 1983, Dye 1985). Bidders may, for example, be reluctant to disclose 
merger forecasts if they reveal proprietary information to competitors or anti-trust regulators, or if 
such forecasts enhance litigation exposure to target shareholders alleging misleading forward-
looking information during the acquisition (Baginski, Hassell, and Kimbrough 2002). Disclosing 
earnings forecasts in particular might expose management to higher scrutiny given that they are 
verifiable ex-post. 
Thus, a trade-off exists for bidding firms’ managers between the benefits of disclosing 
merger forecasts, and the costs of disclosing proprietary information and inviting post-merger 
litigation potentially causing financial and reputational damage. The purpose of this study is, 
therefore, to examine the information and corporate control motives related to voluntary merger 
forecasts by providing evidence on the benefits and costs of their disclosure. For this we hand-
collect merger forecasts by bidding firms, disclosed in press announcements, conference calls and 
SEC filings for a sample of large U.S acquisitions made during 1990 to 2017. 
In estimating the economic consequences of merger forecasts on merger outcomes we 
cannot assume forecasting is randomly assigned to bidders. That is, bidding firms likely self-select 
into the groups that disclose forecasts and those that do not. To control for the endogenous 
relationship between forecasts and merger outcomes we rely on an exogenous source of variation 
to the bidder’s merger forecast decision in an instrumental variables setting. Specifically, we use 
the bidder’s disclosure behavior during regular earnings guidance in the years prior to the 
acquisition announcement and in previous acquisitions as an instrument that is highly correlated 
with merger forecasts, but (we believe to be) unrelated to merger outcomes. In robustness tests, we 
also use the bidder’s industry peers’ disclosure behavior as instrument.   
We find that merger forecast disclosure significantly increases the likelihood of acquisition 
completion and reduces the time to completion. We report a 36% increase in the completion 
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likelihood when forecasts are disclosed. Moreover, consistent with our hypothesis that these 
forecasts are more important in stock-for-stock deals we find that forecast disclosure only has a 
positive effect on the completion likelihood in stock-financed acquisitions, but not in cash 
acquisitions. We further document that conditional on forecasting, providing a quantitative forecast 
leads to an additional 13% increase of the completion likelihood.  
Further providing evidence on the benefits of forecasting we examine their effects on the 
acquisition premium. On the one hand, merger forecasts might reduce the acquisition premium 
necessary to persuade target shareholders by promising them high future earnings.8 On the other 
hand, target shareholders may attempt to bargain for a higher premium the higher the announced 
expected earnings growth of the combined firm. Target shareholders might also try to renegotiate  
after the deal is announced but before closing in cases when the bidder’s forecasts are unexpectedly 
high. We find evidence consistent with this. On average, forecast disclosure reduces the premium 
required to obtain target shareholder approval by about 12%. In contrast, very high quantitative 
forecasts lead to an upward revision of about 3% between initial and final premium. Our findings 
thus indicate that the disclosure of merger forecasts positively affects the value perceptions of target 
shareholders. In further tests we find that these forecasts, in particular quantitative forecasts, also 
affect analyst perceptions by increasing the likelihood that analysts revise their forecasts for the 
bidder upward. 
                                                          
8 At announcement of an acquisition the bidder and target usually have come to an initial agreement and signed term 
sheets, or letter of intents, which include the basic parameters of the proposed deal. This might include the initial 
purchase price. Merger forecasts are usually disclosed after an initial price has been negotiated, but before the final 
price is known at closing. The forecasts may sway target shareholders to accept an already negotiated or offered 
premium which in the absence of the forecasts would have needed to be higher. That is, instead of demanding a 
higher share of the combined firm, target shareholders might accept a lower share, because the combined firm is 
promised to have higher future earnings per share (i.e., they might be satisfied with a smaller percentage share of the 
pie because the pie overall is bigger). Thus, we do not argue that the bidder discloses a forecast and then negotiates 
the premium with the target, but rather that the forecasts might convince the target shareholders to accept the 
premium that was negotiated between the bidder’s and the target’s boards, which they otherwise might have 
considered as too low and not accepted. 
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However, merger forecasts should only be effective in persuading target shareholders of 
the benefits of the deal if they are credible (Hutton et al. 2003). Consequently, when we condition 
our sample on the forecast’s credibility based on the forecasting reputation of the bidding firms’ 
managers, we find that only for credible managers do their forecasts have the beneficial effect on 
the completion likelihood, time to completion and acquisition premium. For bidders that are not 
credible, disclosing forecasts has a negative effect on the completion likelihood and no effect on 
the time to completion or the acquisition premium.  
Finally, we ask: If merger forecasts confer such considerable benefits, why do not all 
bidders forecast? In other words, what explains the cross-sectional variation in merger forecast 
behavior? Consistent with the existence of costs to disclosing forward-looking information at 
merger announcement, we find a significantly higher propensity for bidding firms issuing such 
forecasts to become targets of shareholder lawsuits and find a significantly higher likelihood of 
CEO turnover within two years of merger completion for bidders that provided forecasts at 
announcement–but only for stock-financed acquisitions. Alongside our findings that the benefits 
of forecasting only accrue to acquiring firm managers that have built a credible forecasting 
reputation, we find that the costs of forecast disclosure are borne by those bidders with a low 
forecasting reputation. Moreover, we find a stronger effect of forecasting on the propensity of 
litigation when the post-merger performance of the acquiring firm is poor. 
We thus document both important benefits and costs of merger forecasts. Our study differs 
from prior work on the general disclosure behavior of acquirers around merger announcements 
(Ahern and Sosyura 2014; Kimbrough and Louis 2011) by examining the economic consequences 
of a specific type of disclosure, merger forecasts, beyond cost of capital effects. Our emphasis on 
target shareholders is important, because target shareholders are generally skeptical about 
payments with bidder shares and the completion likelihood of the acquisition is directly dependent 
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on their decision whether to tender their shares and give up control. Our findings suggest that the 
bidders’ forecasts play an important role in this decision. 
The second difference from extant research on disclosures in acquisitions (Houston, James 
and Ryngaert 2001; Bernile and Baugess 2011; Dutordoir, Roosenboom, and Vasconcelos 2014) 
is that we focus on pro-forma earnings per share forecasts instead of synergy estimates because the 
former are more costly, and thus meaningful, signals to investors about the potential benefits of the 
acquisition. Post-merger EPS are easily verifiable whereas understanding whether synergy 
forecasts have materialized ex-post is more difficult as synergy realizations are neither routinely 
disclosed by management nor easily verifiable. 
Third, we provide systematic evidence on the benefits and costs of disclosure, explaining 
why not all bidding firms disclose forward-looking information during acquisitions despite the 
well-documented cost of capital benefits (Leuz and Verrecchia 2000). In Kimbrough and Louis 
(2011), for example, a large part of their sample (38%) does not hold conference calls despite the 
capital market benefits they document. It is often suggested in previous studies that proprietary, 
reputational and litigation costs might outweigh the benefits of disclosure. We provide direct 
empirical evidence on these costs. 
Lastly, our study contributes to the M&A literature by providing evidence on the reasons 
why acquiring and target firm shareholders consent to often value-decreasing mergers financed 
with stock (Asquith 1983; Schlingemann 2004; Moeller et al. 2005; Gu and Lev 2011). With 
merger forecasts we examine one particular mechanism managers use to convince shareholders to 
accept acquisition proposals financed with stock. Our study shows investors learn from the prior 
forecasting behavior of the bidding firm’s managers and that their credibility impacts the benefits 
and costs of merger forecasts. Our findings thus link various research strands in mergers and 
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acquisitions and voluntary disclosure, highlighting the role of merger forecasts in changing the 
perceptions of both bidder and target shareholders in favor of the merger. 
The study is structured as follows. We describe our sample and provide descriptive statistics 
in the next section. Section 3 discusses our identification strategy and research design. We present 
the empirical results on the benefits of merger forecasts in Section 4 and on the costs of merger 
forecasts in section 5. Section 6 presents further tests and a discussion of the robustness of our 
findings. Section 7 concludes the study. 
 
2. Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
2.1 Merger Sample 
We obtain our initial sample of takeovers from Thomson Reuters’ Eikon for the period 1990-2017. 
Both completed and withdrawn bids are included.  We apply the following criteria for our selection: 
Bidder and target firms are US public companies traded on NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ; the 
acquisition announcement date lies between January 1, 1990 and December 31, 2017; and the value 
of the transaction is larger than $100 million. 
We then restrict the sample in each year to the largest 50 takeover announcements by deal 
value, due to limitations in the hand-collection of merger forecasts.9 We concentrate on large 
transactions that are economically significant for the bidder, since integrating a large target will 
most likely have a material impact on the combined firm’s earnings. From this initial sample, we 
first exclude stock repurchases, spin-offs, split-offs, reverse leverage buyouts, joint ventures, 
liquidation plans and transactions of real estate investment trusts (REITs), and further require the 
                                                          
9 Although pro-forma earnings forecast and synergy estimates are available in TR Eikon the data is only sparsely 
populated before 2012. Furthermore, also in the years after 2012 we find earnings forecasts for our sample of 
acquisitions that are missing in TR Eikon.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2198958 
 10 
  
bidder to hold less than 50 percent of the shares of the target prior to the transaction and seek 
control of the majority of shares with the transaction.  
We then hand-collect pro-forma earnings forecasts for the final sample of 1133 takeover 
announcements made during 1990-2017, of which 913 were subsequently completed and 220 were 
withdrawn. We augment the hand collected forecast dataset of the 1133 bidding firms with data on 
transaction characteristics from Thomson Reuters Eikon, and accounting and stock returns from 
COMPUSTAT and CRSP. Analyst consensus forecasts and management guidance data for the 
acquiring firms are obtained from I/B/E/S, and executive compensation and CEO turnover data 
from ExecuComp. We further obtain litigation cases related to M&A transactions from the Stanford 
Law School Securities Action Clearinghouse and download the relevant SEC filings for our sample 
from the SEC EDGAR database.  
2.2 Merger Forecasts 
The collection of merger forecasts for the sample acquisitions involved several keyword searches 
of news announcements, press releases and regulatory filings. In particular, for each acquisition 
announcement we made keyword searches on Factiva in the main business news sources, such as 
Dow Jones News Service, Financial Times, Reuters News Service, and the Wall Street Journal, for 
management announcements of the projected EPS impact of the proposed acquisition. We also 
include in the search conference call transcripts in CQ FD Disclosure (formerly Voxant FD 
Disclosure) that became available from 2002. We examined every article that Factiva retrieved 
from one day before the announcement of the merger to the effective or withdrawal date, as 
provided by Eikon. We focus our analysis on the bidder’s pro-forma EPS forecasts for the first full 
year after merger completion. These forecasts are sometimes qualitative, simply stating whether 
the proposed acquisition is expected to be accretive or dilutive to EPS; or they are quantitative 
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assessments released as range or point EPS estimates. A detailed description of the search 
algorithm is available in Appendix A2.10  
2.3 Sample Characteristics 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for our sample (Panel A)  and deal characteristics broken 
down by disclosure of a forecast (Panel B). By the nature of our sample selection process our 
sample consists of large acquisitions with a mean (median) deal value of $8 billion ($3 billion). 
The mean market value of the bidder (target) is $28 billion ($6 billion) and the mean acquisition 
premium is 31%.  
Panel B reveals that bidders that provide forecasts are involved in significantly larger 
acquisitions, with a difference of around $4 billion in terms of deal value (p-value<0.01). Notably, 
we observe a lower frequency of forecasts when cash is the only the means of payment (31% versus 
48%, p-value<0.01), and more acquisition attempts completed successfully when forecasts are 
disclosed (86% versus 65% for non-forecasters, p-value<0.01). The proportion of forecasts made 
in acquisitions with stock or mixed payments (69%) is significantly higher than in cash-only deals 
(31%).  Table 1 also shows that forecasts are less frequent in acquisitions with multiple bidders 
and during hostile takeover attempts. These findings point towards certain costs associated with 
revealing inside information to competitors and the target firm, presumably because of a weaker 
bargaining position when potential synergies are disclosed. We do not find statistically significant 
differences in the acquisition premium in these univariate comparisons.  
 
 
                                                          
10 In addition to the keyword search on Factiva, for each acquiring firm we ran a query using the same keywords as 
above in the full-text SEC filings search engine of Capital IQ, for filings submitted to the SEC during the same time 
interval, from one day before the announcement date of the transaction until the effective or withdrawal date. We 
focused our search on current event disclosures (8-K), proxy statements (DEF 14, PREM 14) and prospectus 
disclosures (425, S-4). 
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3. Research Design and Identification Strategy 
3.1 Identification Strategy 
The descriptive statistics in section 3 reveal significant differences in acquisition and bidder 
characteristics between forecasters and non-forecasters, suggesting that the decision to forecast 
may be determined endogenously. For example, it is plausible that large deals are more likely to 
be stock financed and to arise from friendly negotiations resulting in a higher likelihood of deal 
completion, expedited deal closing and a lower premium and also be those deals, in which the 
bidder is more likely to provide forecasts because of those very same characteristics. Furthermore, 
it is also plausible that higher deal completion rates and forecasts occur during acquisition waves 
which coincide with stock market booms, both of which are signs of overall market optimism and 
might in turn be associated with higher deal completion rates as well as subsequent litigation and 
CEO turnover when the optimism recedes. That is, standard probit and OLS regressions on merger 
outcome variables, such as acquisition completion and the merger premium, possibly suffer from 
self-selection and omitted variable bias producing unreliable estimates.  
We address this selection problem using instrumental variable regressions in a system of 
equations, which consists of a probit selection equation that models the bidder’s choice to disclose 
a forecast and that includes the instrumental variable and an outcome equation that models the 
merger outcome such as the completion likelihood or premium. Specifically, we estimate the 
determinants of the endogenous choice dummy variable FORECAST and its effect on merger 
outcomes in bivariate probit regressions, when the outcome equation also includes a binary 
dependent variable such as merger completion, and in treatment effects regressions, when the 
outcome equation includes a continuous dependent variable such as the acquisition premium 
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(Heckman 1979; Maddala 1983; Tucker 2010). 11  We estimate all regressions using full-
information maximum likelihood; that is, we estimate selection and outcome equations in one 
system (Tucker 2010).12  
To improve identification, the selection equation relies on an instrumental variable that 
introduces exogenous variation in forecasting behavior, but is itself uncorrelated with the error 
term in the outcome equation. In other words, any chosen instrument needs to satisfy the exclusion 
restrictions for valid instruments (Larcker and Rusticus 2010; Roberts and Whited 2013). Any firm 
fundamentals or acquisition related characteristics will likely be related to both the propensity to 
forecast and merger outcomes and therefore not qualify as an instrument. We accordingly construct 
an instrument PREDISPOSITION that measures the predisposition of the bidder’s management to 
disclose merger forecasts, which we assume is not directly correlated with merger outcomes other 
than through management’s propensity to forecast. We discuss the construction of this instrument 
next. 
3.2 Instrumental Variable 
The prior literature has found past forecasting behavior to influence the decision to forecast—
forecasting inertia (Graham, Harvey, Rajgopal 2005; Skinner 1994). We therefore model the 
bidder’s forecasting history by creating an indicator variable equal to one if the bidder has disclosed 
earnings guidance during the full year prior to the acquisition announcement (GUIDANCE), and 
an indicator variable for forecast disclosures in prior acquisitions (PAST). While the condition that 
prior forecasting does not affect merger outcomes directly cannot be tested, we argue that prior 
                                                          
11 See Tucker (2010) for a summary of the appropriate choice of model in linear and non-linear systems of equations. 
The applications of selection models in corporate finance and accounting are also discussed in Li and Prabhala 
(2009) and Lennox et al (2012). 
12 We implement full information maximum likelihood estimation with the user-written STATA command cmp 
(Roodman 2011). 
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guidance issuance or forecasts in prior mergers in the past three years are unlikely to affect current 
merger outcomes, such as completion rates and acquisition premiums. 
We also make use of several regulatory changes that took place during our sample period 
that likely affected the decision to voluntarily disclose merger forecasts. The most important of 
these for acquisitions is the introduction of Regulation M-A by the SEC in January 2000. 
Regulation M-A permitted increased communication between public companies involved in stock 
mergers and their shareholders before the filing of a registration statement. Its introduction 
presumably had a positive effect on the propensity to disclose forecasts during mergers. 13 
Similarly, the introduction of Regulation FD (Fair Disclosure) in October 2000, prohibiting 
selective sharing of material information with investors, was found to increase the likelihood of 
public disclosure (Heflin, Subramanyam, and Zhang 2003).14 We combine both regulations into 
one indicator variable equal to one for the years after 2000 (REGULATION).  
We then construct the instrument PREDISPOSITION that measures the predisposition of 
the bidder’s management to disclose merger forecasts by combining the three indicator variables 
GUIDANCE, PAST and REGULATION to one instrument. Hence, PREDISPOSITION takes the 
value zero if the bidder has not provided regular earnings guidance in the immediate past, has not 
disclosed merger forecasts in previous acquisitions, and if the acquisition took place in a regulatory 
environment not conducive to market-wide disclosure, that is, pre Regulation FD and Regulation 
MA described above. The variable takes the value of one if any one of these indicators applies, the 
value two if two apply and the value three if all three indicators are switched on. We thus argue 
that under a regulatory environment conducive to voluntary disclosure, and if the bidder has a 
                                                          
13 Pre-Regulation MA, acquiring firms were constrained in the disclosure of forward-looking information associated 
with equity offerings (so called gun jumping). Although disclosures were not prohibited, they were limited in their 
form and content. 
14 Heflin et al (2003) find increased disclosure of regular (quarterly) management earnings forecasts in the years post 
Regulation-FD. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2198958 
 15 
  
forecasting history, bidder managers will more likely disclose merger forecasts. Therefore, we 
expect PREDISPOSITION to be positively correlated with the propensity to forecast, but not 
correlated with acquisition completion rates or the acquisition premium, other than through its 
effect on forecast disclosure. We discuss the validity of the instrument and results using alternative 
instruments in robustness tests in section 7. 
3.3 Credibility of Forecasts 
Merger forecasts should only be effective in persuading target shareholders of the benefits of the 
deal if they are credible (Hutton et al. 2003). Therefore, we condition our sample on forecast 
credibility. For this we rely on the prior forecasting reputation of the bidding firm’s managers in 
their regular earnings guidance to construct an ‘ex-ante’ credibility measure observable by market 
participants at the time of the merger. 
Following Hutton and Stocken (2009) we estimate managerial forecasting ability using 
managers’ prior accuracy, bias and consistency of their annual earnings guidance in comparison 
with the same characteristics for analyst forecasts. Specifically, we compute three indicator 
variables, ACCURACY, BIAS and CONSISTENCY, set equal to 1 respectively, if: 
𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 < 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 
𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 < 𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 < 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 
and 0 otherwise. The accuracy, bias and consistency of management and analyst consensus 
forecasts are measured as the absolute forecast error, signed forecast error, and standard deviation 
of the forecast error, respectively, in the three years prior to the merger announcement: 
𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑖 =  
1
𝑡
∑ 𝑎𝑏𝑠(𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡)
𝑡−1
𝑡−4
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𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑖 =  
1
𝑡
∑(𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡)
𝑡−1
𝑡−4
 
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖 =  √∑ [(𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡) −
1
𝑡
∑(𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡)
𝑡−1
𝑡−4
]
2𝑡−1
𝑡−4
 
We construct our measure of CREDIBILITY using the three indicator variables 
ACCURACY, BIAS and CONSISTENCY as follows. If the bidder’s earnings forecasts in the three 
years prior to the acquisition announcement have been consistently more accurate, less biased and 
more consistent than analyst consensus estimates, CREDIBILITY is equal to 3. If, on the other hand, 
the bidder’s forecasts have been consistently worse on these dimensions compared to analysts, 
CREDIBILITY is equal to 0. CREDIBILITY is equal to 1 (2) if the bidder is better on one (two) of 
the dimensions than analysts, respectively. 
We then repeat our tests of the consequences of merger forecasts for separate sub-samples 
of bidders with and without credible forecasting reputation, partitioning the sample into firms with 
a strong forecasting reputation if CREDIBILITY >0, and the remaining (CREDIBILITY =0) having 
a weak forecasting reputation.15 
3.4 Other Controls 
In the selection and outcome regressions we control for a variety of variables identified in the prior 
literature to determine merger outcomes and disclosure behavior. For example, we control for deal 
characteristics such as the method of payment, STOCK (Kimborough and Louis 2011), termination 
fees, TERMFEE, and tender offers, TENDER (Schwert 2000; Officer 2003; Bates and Lemmon 
2003), prior toeholds, TOEHOLD (Betton and Eckbo 2000) and serial acquirers, SERIAL as well 
as firm characteristics such as relative firm size between acquirer and target, SIZE (Kasznik and 
                                                          
15 We also repeat the analysis partitioning the sample into credible forecasting firms with a minimum credibility 
score of 2 instead of 1. Our inferences remain largely the same. 
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Lev 1995; Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz 2004), risk of litigation, LITIGIOUS (Skinner 1994, 
1997), uncertainty proxied by prior earnings volatility, VOLATILITY (Rogers and Stocken 2005), 
and other confounding factors such as industry relatedness (FOCUS) and competing bids 
(COMPETITION) and disclosed synergy estimates (SYNERGIES). All variables are defined in 
Appendix A1. Table 2 reports univariate correlations between the independent variables. 
 
4. The Benefits of Merger Forecasts 
In this section we provide evidence on the consequences of merger forecasts for the acquisition 
completion likelihood and time to completion as well as the acquisition premium and the incidence 
of rival bids. 
4.1 Deal Completion and Duration 
Table 3 reports estimates of the effect of forecasting on the likelihood of merger completion. The 
regressions are estimated using full-information maximum likelihood biprobit. In the selection 
equation we model the propensity to disclose a merger forecast (FORECAST) as described above 
using the instrumental variable PREDISPOSITION. In the outcome equation we model the 
propensity of merger completion, in which the outcome variable COMPLETION—the dependent 
variable—is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the acquisition was completed, and zero otherwise. 
We also model the outcome variable DURATION as the number of days from announcement to 
completion weighted by the size of the deal. The explanatory variables of the selection and outcome 
regressions are identical, except for the instrument, which is excluded from the outcome 
regressions. In Table 3 and all subsequent tables we provide three sets of results. The first two 
columns, under the label ALL, report the results for the regressions on COMPLETION with the 
outcome probit regression results on the left and the selection probit regression results on the right. 
The columns labelled DURATION show the outcome regression results on the time to completion 
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and the columns labelled QUANT report results of the completion likelihood for the subset of 
quantitative forecasts. The second pair of columns, labelled PAYMENT, report the results of the 
outcome regressions by the method of payment and the third pair of columns report the results of 
the outcome regressions by CREDIBILITY (WEAK, i.e., CREDIBILITY = 0 versus STRONG, i.e., 
CREDIBILITY > 1). We report marginal effects for FORECAST at the bottom of the table. All 
regressions in Table 3 and subsequent regressions are estimated using heteroscedasticity-robust 
standard errors and controlling for industry and year fixed-effects.16  
Regarding the ALL sample the results in the left pair of columns show that the disclosure 
of merger forecasts significantly increases the likelihood that an acquisition is completed, after 
controlling for various confounding factors. In particular, the relation between FORECAST and  
COMPLETION  is significantly positive (coefficient = 1.88, z-statistic = 7.49). The marginal effect 
of FORECAST on the likelihood to complete an acquisition is 36% holding all other variables at 
their means. The results of the selection regression confirms the highly statistically significant 
coefficient on the instrument PREDISPOSITION (coefficient = 0.40, z-statistic = 4.35).  
If merger forecasts have a positive effect on the target’s decision to accept the offer, we 
should also expect forecast-backed takeover bids to generate less resistance from the target and 
thus close the acquisitions faster. The column DURATION reports the results of the outcome 
regression from treatment-effects regressions, in which the selection equation models the choice to 
forecast and the outcome regression models the determinants of the outcome variable DURATION 
The regression only includes completed mergers.17 The column reveals that disclosing merger 
forecasts significantly decreases the time to completion, after controlling for various confounding 
                                                          
16 The results of the selection equations for the regressions by CREDIBILITY and PAYMENT are omitted in this 
and all subsequent tables for ease of exposition. We also test the robustness of our results (untabulated) by removing 
fixed effects in our non-linear models because of the well-known incidental parameter bias in non-linear estimations 
with fixed effects (Nickel 1981; Lancaster 2000). Our inferences remain largely the same. 
17 We test the robustness of our results on the full sample using a Cox proportional hazard model, in which the event 
is the acquisition completion (Cox 1972). Our inferences remain the same. 
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factors. Specifically, the coefficient on FORECAST  is significantly negative at −0.036 (z-statistic 
= −2.21) suggesting that disclosing a forecast decreases the deal-size weighted duration by 17% 
compared to the unconditional mean of 0.206. This translates into a meaningful reduction of 63 
days for the average deal. 
When examining the subset of quantitative forecasts the results in Table 3 reveal that 
conditional on providing a forecast, disclosing a quantitative forecast, has a larger positive effect 
on merger completion. The coefficient on QUANTITATIVE is significantly positive at 0.80 (z-
statistic=4.95). The marginal effect on the completion likelihood of disclosing a quantitative 
forecast is an additional 13% compared to disclosing a qualitative forecast. This result could obtain  
because quantitative forecasts are a more costly signal as they expose managers to greater litigation 
and reputational loss and thus are more influential on target shareholders or because managers are 
more likely to disclose quantitative forecasts in deals for which they are more certain about the 
outcome.   
Conditioning the sample on the payment method in the second set of columns (PAYMENT) 
the findings in Table 3 reveal that the coefficient on FORECAST is significantly positive when 
stock is used as payment (coefficient = 1.49, z-statistic = 3.14), but insignificant in cash-only 
acquisitions (coefficient = 0.31, z-statistic = 0.15). The marginal effect of FORECAST on 
COMPLETION is 28% for acquisitions with stock payments. The results are consistent with our 
prediction that merger forecasts are more important in stock-financed acquisitions. 
 Conditioning the sample on the credibility of the forecast in the third set of columns 
(CREDIBILITY) the findings in Table 3 reveal that the coefficient on FORECAST is only 
significantly positive for bidders with STRONG credibility (coefficient = 1.73, z-statistic = 6.72), 
but significantly negative for bidders in the WEAK group (coefficient = −0.93, z-statistic = −8.67). 
The marginal effect of FORECAST on COMPLETION is 34% if the forecast is credible, but −22%, 
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if the forecast is not credible, i.e., when the bidder’s management has a weak forecasting reputation. 
The results indicate that the benefits of forecasting only accrue to those bidders that are credible in 
their forecasting behavior. 
In sum, we identified an important economic consequence of merger forecast—enhancing 
the likelihood of deal completion and faster deal closing, in particular when disclosing quantitative 
forecasts, in stock deals and only if the forecasts are credible. 
4.2 Acquisition Premium and Rival Bids 
As discussed in the introduction, in stock-for-stock acquisitions target shareholders weigh the 
premium offered against the expected merger synergies, which benefit them if they keep the 
bidder’s stock. Accordingly, a target may accept a lower premium in return for higher expected 
synergies, if the sum of the two compensates target shareholders for giving up control. This trade-
off naturally provides bidding firms with an additional incentive to disclose merger forecasts, 
informing target shareholders of the expected synergies, or future gains. On the other hand, 
disclosing an unexpectedly high forecast might invite target shareholders to try to renegotiate for a 
higher price and might therefore lead to a higher final purchase price. Moreover, a high forecast 
might also invite competitors to initiate a rival bid if the disclosed expected earnings accretion 
reveals to them that the target might be undervalued.    
To examine the relationship between the forecast decision and the offer premium, Table 4 
presents results of treatment-effects regressions on the acquisition premium. In the treatment-
effects regressions the selection equations model the choice to forecast and the outcome regressions 
model the determinants of the outcome variable PREMIUM. PREMIUM is measured as the natural 
logarithm of the difference between the final offer price per share (i.e., the final price paid for 
completed mergers and the last offer made for uncompleted mergers) and the target’s share price 
one week before the acquisition announcement. The explanatory variables of the selection and 
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outcome regressions are identical, except for the instrument, which is excluded from the outcome 
regressions. To be consistent with our hypothesis that forecasts are means to convince target 
shareholders to accept a lower premium, we constrain this analysis to deals that have been 
completed. All regressions include industry and year fixed effects.   
Regarding the ALL sample the findings in Table 4 reveal that the coefficient on FORECAST 
is significantly negative (coefficient = -0.41, z-statistic = -2.01) consistent with the forecast 
reducing the premium necessary to convince target shareholders to give up control. With an 
unconditional mean (log) premium of (3.19) 33.6% the coefficient suggests a 13% reduction in the 
log premium. This translates into a 4.3% lower acquisition premium for the average deal. The 
results of the selection regression are consistent with the previous results shown in Table 3 
documenting a highly statistically significant coefficient on the instrument PREDISPOSITION 
(coefficient = 0.57, z-statistic = 5.08). We do not find a significant coefficient on quantitative 
forecasts, perhaps due to the ambiguous effect of high quantitative forecasts on the premium 
discussed above. We will investigate this further in Table 5 below. 
Conditioning the sample on PAYMENT the findings in Table 4 reveal that the coefficient 
on FORECAST is only significantly negative for acquisitions that involve stock payments 
(coefficient = −0.40, z-statistic = −1.68), albeit weakly so, but not for cash-only acquisitions 
(coefficient = −0.45, z-statistic = −1.53). The results are consistent with our prediction that the 
merger forecasts are more important in stock-financed acquisitions. Conditioning the sample on 
CREDIBILITY we do not find that the coefficient on FORECAST is significantly negative for 
bidders that have a STRONG forecast credibility although it has the expected sign.  
As discussed above disclosing a particularly high forecast might invite the target to try to 
renegotiate the premium or might attract rival bids. We therefore create a variable EPS_GROWTH 
measured as the quintile rank of the expected EPS growth implicit in management’s forecast 
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compared to the prior fiscal year. For ease of interpretation the quintile rank is divided by five so 
that the variable has a value of 1 for observations with the highest EPS growth forecast.  
Table 5 presents the results of treatment-effects regressions of the magnitude of the revised 
premium, measured as the difference between the initial premium (at announcement) and the final 
premium (at closing), and of probit regressions of a dummy variable equal to 1 indicating the 
existence of competing bid on our variables of interest FORECAST and EPS_GROWTH. 
Consistent with our previous results, column 1 in the table reveals that disclosing a (qualitative or 
quantitative) forecast reduces the final premium (coefficient = −7.44, z-statistic = −7.77) . This 
result does not mean that the bidder is able to renegotiate a lower premium when disclosing a 
forecast, but it is more likely, given the higher likelihood of stock or mixed payments in deals for 
which the bidder discloses a forecast, that target shareholders are more willing to accept the deal 
even if the stock portion of the payment falls in value between announcement and deal closing.18 
However, the results in column 2 also reveal that EPS_GROWTH is positively associated with the 
change in premium suggesting that a very high quantitative forecast increases the final premium 
(coefficient = 2.66, z-statistic = 2.07). This could be either because target shareholders are more 
likely to renegotiate or because the bidders stock revalues upward after the announcement due to 
the expectations of high earnings growth. The table further reveals that rival bids are less likely in 
acquisitions for which the bidder discloses a forecast (coefficient = −1.06, z-statistic = −2.08), but 
that there is no significant relationship with the magnitude of the EPS forecast.  
Overall, the findings presented in this section indicate that bidders’ merger forecasts are 
associated with a higher likelihood of acquisition completion and a shorter time to completion. The 
results also indicate that in acquisitions for which bidders disclose earnings forecasts, the target 
firms accept lower premiums, on average. In contrast, disclosing a very high quantitative forecasts 
                                                          
18 We investigate the potential risk of a revaluation of the bidder’s stock after the announcement of the acquisition 
further in section 7. 
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leads to an increase in the final premium. Overall, the documented benefits of forecasting are 
evidently compelling reasons to provide these merger forecasts. So, why do many bidders (26% in 
our sample) refrain from forecasting? The next section provides evidence on the costs of 
forecasting. 
 
5. The Costs of Merger Forecasts 
5.1 Post-Merger Litigation 
To examine the costs of disclosing earnings forecasts in acquisitions, we match our merger sample 
with a sample of shareholder lawsuits following acquisitions alleging misinformation by bidders. 
Specifically, we define an indicator variable LITIGATION, set equal to one when the bidding firm 
was subject to litigation related to the acquisition within three years of completing the deal.19 For 
example, in one of the litigation cases the complaint reads: “as a result of defendant’s materially 
false and misleading statements [...], the value of shares of the St Paul’s common stock was 
artificially inflated and former Travellers shareholders who acquired shares of St Paul’s common 
stock pursuant to the merger were damaged thereby”.20   
Merger forecasting and the exposure to litigation may be jointly determined by unobserved 
managerial traits, such as a managerial tendency for fraudulent behavior. This unobserved 
heterogeneity may not be specific to forecasting or to acquisitions, but might lead to an endogenous 
relation between forecasting and the litigation likelihood. We, therefore, employ the same 
identification strategy as before using multivariate instrumental probit regressions.  
                                                          
19 Safe harbor provisions in relation to forecasting in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act mean that 
misleading forecasts are unlikely to be selected by lawyers as the overt grounds for attacking bidders’ management 
in cases of litigation.  But the disappointed expectations as a result of undelivered forecasts might well motivate 
litigation, deploying whatever complaints in the particular case might carry weight in court.  
20 See In re St. Paul Travelers Securities Litigation I, United States District Court, District of Minnesota, Civil No. 
04-3801 (JRT/FLN), 2004.  
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Table 6 presents the results of the regression analysis on the likelihood to be involved in 
post-acquisition litigation (LITIGATION). These and the subsequent regressions on CEO turnover 
are conditioned on merger completion. Regarding the ALL sample the findings reveal that on 
average the disclosure of merger forecasts do not increase the likelihood of post-acquisition 
litigation although the coefficient has the expected positive sign. The results of the selection 
regression again confirm the highly statistically significant coefficient on the instrument 
PREDISPOSITION (coefficient = 0.59, z-statistic = 5.26). The results in column 3 also show that 
disclosing a quantitative forecast has no effect on the litigation likelihood.  
 However, conditioning the sample on the payment method in the PAYMENT columns the 
findings in Table 6 reveal that the coefficient on FORECAST is significantly positive for 
acquisitions that involve stock payments (coefficient = 1.24, z-statistic = 9.06). The marginal effect 
of FORECAST on LITIGATION is 28% for acquisitions with stock payments. In contrast, the 
coefficient on FORECAST is significantly negative in acquisitions with cash. Conditioning the 
sample on CREDIBILITY the findings in Table 6 reveal that the coefficient on FORECAST is 
significantly negative for those bidders that have STRONG credibility (coefficient = −1.55, z-
statistic = −6.80). That is, bidders face a 36% lower litigation likelihood if the forecast is perceived 
to be credible. The results indicate that the litigation risk increases only for bidders that are not 
credible in their forecasting behavior and that use stock as financing method. 
5.2 Post-merger CEO Turnover 
Table 7 examines the effect of FORECAST on another potential cost: the likelihood of the acquiring 
CEO leaving the firm post-acquisition (TURNOVER). The findings in Table 7 provide additional 
support for our interpretation of the findings in Table 6 that forecasts, particularly by bidders with 
a low forecasting reputation and by those using stock as payment, come with serious costs. The 
findings of the PAYMENT sub-samples reveal a significantly higher likelihood of CEO turnover 
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for stock-financed acquisitions (coefficient = 1.20, z-statistic = 5.66), but a significantly lower 
likelihood in cash acquisitions (coefficient = −1.41, z-statistic = −4.03). The marginal effect of 
FORECAST on CEO TURNOVER in stock-financed acquisitions is 21%.  
Table 7 further shows a 45% higher propensity of CEO turnover post-merger for bidders 
with WEAK credibility (coefficient = 2.09, z-statistic = 4.07), compared to a −33% lower 
likelihood of CEO departure for bidders in the STRONG group (coefficient = −1.38, z-statistic = 
−1.68). These results further indicate the severity of the potential costs to the CEO of the bidding 
firm in disclosing forecasts, particularly if these forecasts are not credible.21  
5.3 Post-merger Performance and Forecast Costs 
Shareholder lawsuits and CEO dismissal should be more likely when the post-merger performance 
of the acquiring firm is poor as the prior forecast might provide shareholders the basis to hold the 
bidder’s managers to account. A negative post-merger stock market performance of the combined 
firm indicates that the combined firm did not perform according to expectations. Accordingly, we 
repeat our previous analyses on the litigation and CEO turnover likelihood interacting FORECAST 
with proxies for the post-merger stock return performance of the acquiring firm.22 Specifically, we 
include as interaction variable an indicator variable (NEGPOST) that takes the value 1 if the 
acquiring firm’s buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) in the 24 months after completion of the 
merger is negative, and zero otherwise. 23  If the effect of FORECAST on LITIGATION and 
TURNOVER is more pronounced due to poor post-merger performance, we expect the interaction 
                                                          
21 One should use caution interpreting these results however. Although it is generally the case that the CEO of the 
acquiring firm will also become CEO of the combined firm, we cannot determine for certain whether the CEO’s 
departure post-merger is forced or part of a negotiated succession plan at time of the merger. 
22 Our estimations do not require additional instrumental variables for the identification of the interaction terms as 
the coefficients of the interaction terms are identified whenever the coefficients of the main effects without the 
interactions are identified (Wooldridge 2010, p.266 and 596). 
23 We estimate monthly BHAR using a Fama-French-Momentum four factor model. We use buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns instead of cumulative abnormal returns due to the well documented problems with using CARs in long-term 
return studies (e.g., Konrad and Kaul 1993, Barber and Lyon 1997). 
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term to be significantly positive. As alternative we interact FORECAST with the actual value of 
the post-merger BHARs (POSTBHAR). If the effect of FORECAST on LITIGATION and 
TURNOVER is more pronounced due to poor post-merger performance, we expect the interaction 
term in these regressions to be significantly negative. 
Table 8 summarizes the results of the outcome regressions with the interaction terms. The 
findings in Table 8 are consistent with the hypothesis that the effect of merger forecasts on the 
litigation likelihood are more pronounced if the acquiring firm underperforms post-merger. We do 
not, however, find a more pronounced effect on the CEO turnover likelihood. Specifically, the 
coefficients of the interaction term FORECAST×NEGPOST in the regressions on LITIGATION is 
significantly positive (coefficients = 0.81, z-statistic = 2.73). Equally consistent with expectations 
the coefficient of the interaction term FORECAST×POSTBHAR in the regressions on LITIGATION 
is significantly negative (coefficient = −1.98, z-statistic = −3.74). 
Overall, the results in this section indicate that there are substantial costs to disclosing 
merger forecasts, particularly when the acquiring firm underperforms post-merger. In addition, the 
credibility loss and reputational penalties in subsequent disclosures and subsequent acquisitions 
might further deter bidders from disclosing merger forecasts (Lev and Penman 1990). This helps 
to explain the cross-sectional variation in forecasting behavior among bidders. We next provide 
further evidence on the characteristics of the subset of quantitative forecasts and discuss several 
robustness tests. 
 
6. Further Tests and Discussion 
6.1 Quantitative Forecasts 
In our tests on merger outcomes above we found that conditional on providing a forecast disclosing 
a quantitative forecast has a stronger effect on the likelihood of merger completion than if the 
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bidder simply discloses whether the proposed acquisition is going to be accretive or dilutive. 
However, we do not find any strong evidence that a quantitative forecast has an effect on the merger 
premium or exposes the bidder to higher litigation risk. In this section we more closely examine 
the accuracy of these forecasts and whether analysts respond to them.  
Table 9, Panel A reports forecast errors of management’s and analysts’ pro-forma EPS 
forecasts for the fiscal year post acquisition (i.e., for the combined entity). Analyst forecasts are 
measured as of the closest day after the acquisition announcement. Forecast errors are calculated 
as the forecast minus actual divided by the share price at the end of the prior fiscal year (column 
on the left) and divided by the  absolute value of the actual (column on the right). The panel shows 
that analysts are overly optimistic about the future EPS of the combined firm. Irrespective of the 
scaling variable used, consensus errors are significantly positive at 0.004 and 0.485 (t-statistics = 
3.09 and 3.61). The evidence on the management forecast error is more mixed showing no 
significant difference from zero when scaled by price and a significantly positive error when scaled 
by the actual. However, we do not find a statistically significant difference between the 
management forecasts errors and the consensus errors. 
We next examine whether analysts respond to merger forecasts by changing their 
consensus estimates for the bidder compared to prior to the acquisition announcement. Table 9, 
Panel B reports the results of regressions of a dependent variable equal to one if the consensus is 
higher after the acquisition, and zero otherwise, on our indicator variable FORECAST (column on 
the left) and on the continuous variable PROFORMA_EPS (column on the right). The table reveals 
that analysts are more likely to upgrade their consensus forecast when the bidder discloses merger 
forecasts and in particular when the bidder discloses quantitative forecasts. The propensity to 
upgrade increases by 51% (z-statistic = 7.01) when the bidder discloses a forecast. Furthermore, 
with regards to quantitative forecasts a one standard deviation increase in management’s pro-forma 
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estimate increases the likelihood of a consensus upgrade by 25.2%. The results indicate that both 
management and analyst consensus estimates are overly optimistic and that analysts respond to the 
information provided by the bidder’s management.  
6.2 The Effects of Confounding Information 
As discussed in the introduction anecdotal evidence suggests that investors focus on the impact of 
acquisitions on earnings per share and thus likely consider the bidder’s pro-forma earnings 
forecasts for the proposed merger as particularly important for their decision making. However, 
shareholders receive an abundance of other information related to the merging firms in the official 
merger documents and proxy filings such as the Form S-4 in stock-for-stock transactions. That is, 
shareholders likely receive other merger-relevant information beyond merger forecasts to be able 
to make an assessment of the proposed merger. In our main regressions we control for whether the 
bidder discloses synergy estimates as a proxy for additional forward-looking information similar 
to earnings forecasts and we find that this control variable has some explanatory power in the 
regressions. To further test the robustness of our results to confounding information we 
electronically parse the merger documents filed with the SEC.24  
We collect information on the number of words and the percentage of forward-looking 
words in the merger filings, as well as the tone, measured as the percentage of positive words minus 
the percentage of negative words as defined in Loughran and McDonald (2011).25 We use these 
variables as proxies for the amount of information generally, the amount of forward-looking 
information and the overall sentiment of the information that investors receive. All variables are 
described in the Appendix. To the extent that the amount of qualitative and quantitative information 
                                                          
24 Specifically, we parse the merger prospectus and proxy statement, SEC Forms DEFM14 and S-4. These filings 
include information about the transaction, its terms and rationale, historical and pro-forma financial data about the 
acquirer and the target and other mandatory disclosures about the acquiring firm and its management.  
25 Alternatively, instead of the number of words we use the number of financial numbers and the file size of the 
filing, both of which are highly correlated with the number of words. Our inferences remain the same. 
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provided to investors in the prospectus and proxy statements are correlated with our proxies, the 
inclusion of these variables controls (at least partly) for other confounding information that bidders 
disclose in addition to earnings forecasts which might affect target shareholder’s decisions.  
Table 10 shows the results of the regression on COMPLETION, DURATION and 
PREMIUM with these additional variables included as regressors. The coefficients on FORECAST 
are 1.80 (z-statistic = 5.62), −0.04 (z-statistic = −1.57) and −0.53 (z-statistic = −2.38), respectively. 
The findings reveal that the coefficients remain statistically significant, except in the regression on 
DURATION, where the coefficient now is insignificant. Our inferences, that merger forecasts play 
an important role in investors’ decision making, thus remain largely unchanged after inclusion of 
these additional control variables. 
6.3 Instrument Validity and Alternative Instruments 
For robust identification, it is necessary that our instrumental variable (IV) PREDISPOSITION 
introduces exogenous variation to forecasting, but is itself uncorrelated with the error term in the 
outcome equations; that is, PREDISPOSITION should be relevant and should satisfy the exclusion 
restrictions for valid instruments. As shown in the first-stage regression results (the selection 
equation) in Tables 3-7 the instrument is highly statistically significant in explaining the variation 
in forecasting with a z-statistic higher than four in all regressions. However, with one IV and one 
endogenous explanatory variable (FORECAST) we cannot test the exogeneity of the IV. We 
therefore repeat our IV regression on the completion likelihood by decomposing our instrument 
into two of its components, GUIDANCE and PAST (see section 4.2.) and test the overidentification 
restrictions. We obtain an F-statistic for the test that the instruments are jointly zero of 14.81, again 
giving us comfort that the instruments are relevant. We also run a Sagran-Hansen test for 
overidentification and obtain a J statistic of 0.11 suggesting that we cannot reject that our 
instruments are valid. i.e., uncorrelated with the error term, and that the excluded instruments are 
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correctly excluded from the outcome equation. These tests provide us with more confidence about 
the validity of our instrument. We nevertheless test the robustness of our results with alternative 
instruments next. 
Goodman et al. (2014) find an association of past forecasting precision with subsequent 
positive merger announcement returns suggesting that managers that are better forecasters are also 
able to make better acquisition decisions. That is, it might be that higher quality managers are also 
more transparent managers, and because they are managers of high quality, they are also able to 
complete better acquisitions. We find in untabulated results that prior managerial guidance 
accuracy is significantly negatively correlated with the decision to disclose merger forecasts in our 
sample. In addition, our instrument does not depend on the precision of prior management guidance 
as in Goodman et al (2014), but solely on whether or not management did forecast previously. In 
untabulated results we do not find that our results on merger forecast consequences depend on the 
precision of prior earnings guidance. 
Nevertheless, the Goodman et al. (2014) findings raise a more general concern that both 
our instrument PREDISPOSITION and the merger outcomes we investigate, such as completion 
rates or merger premiums, are correlated with unobserved managerial characteristics. In order to 
provide further evidence on the robustness of our results we therefore repeat our main tests using 
two alternative instruments that are less likely to be correlated with prior managerial forecasting 
ability. As the first alternative we orthogonalize PREDISPOSITION to managerial forecasting 
ability by using the residuals of a regression of PREDISPOSITION on the indicator variables, 
ACCURACY, BIAS and CONSISTENCY, which measure managerial forecasting ability 
(discussed in Section 4). In so far as these variables are correlated with managerial forecasting 
ability we orthogonalize our instrument to these characteristics.  The residuals of this regression 
are likely to reflect innate managerial traits that predispose these managers to be more forthcoming 
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with disclosures other than due to the fact that they are good forecasters. We call this new 
instrument INNATE. 
The second alternative instrument exploits variation in the guidance disclosure behavior of 
the bidding firm's peer group (PEERGUIDANCE) measured as the percentage of firms in the same 
two-digit SIC industry as the bidding firm that disclosed annual earnings guidance for the full fiscal 
year prior to the acquisition announcement. PEERGUIDANCE varies across industries and over 
time. We believe that the peer firms' disclosure behavior is correlated to the bidder's own disclosure 
behavior through peer pressure effects. For example, investors might demand more disclosure, such 
as earnings guidance, by a firm if all other firms in its industry disclose earnings guidance; or the 
firm's management might regard it necessary to provide earnings guidance if all other firms disclose 
guidance because it might be seen as best practice in the industry. Thus, we argue that 
PEERGUIDANCE is unlikely to be correlated to the bidder's managerial quality and only have an 
effect on merger outcomes through the bidder's disclosure decision that is driven by industry peer 
pressure. 
Table 11 summarizes the results of the main tests from Tables 3-7 using INNATE (Panel 
A), and PEERGUIDANCE (Panel B) as alternative instruments. We find that the instruments are 
generally highly predictive of forecasting in the selection regression and that our inferences from 
the outcome regressions overall remain unchanged. 26  For example, using INNATE and 
PEERGUIDANCE as instruments the coefficients on FORECAST are significantly positive in the 
regressions on COMPLETION (coefficients = 0.77 and 1.64, z-statistic = 1.84 and 6.79, 
respectively) and TURNOVER (coefficients = 1.54 and 1.67, z-statistic = 9.80 and 11.06, 
respectively), and significantly negative in the regressions on DURATION (coefficients = −0.06 
                                                          
26  The only difference is that FORECAST is insignificantly different from zero in the outcome regression on 
LITIGATION. 
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and −0.03, z-statistic = −3.55 and −1.65, respectively) and PREMIUM (coefficients = −0.32 and 
−0.38, z-statistic = −1.65 and −1.71, respectively). 
6.4 Further Discussion 
Naturally, beyond the issues raised in the robustness tests, our study has several limitations. First, 
our merger sample is not drawn randomly, but is purposely biased toward larger acquisitions. We 
limited our sample to larger acquisitions for three reasons: to facilitate our hand-collection efforts 
of merger forecasts and because these forecasts are more common for large firms and more 
economically meaningful for larger acquisitions, which have a greater impact on the acquirer’s 
earnings per share. Netter, Stegemoller and Wintoki (2011) show that restricting acquisition 
samples to larger acquisitions can lead to different inferences than those found using much broader 
samples. We therefore caution against the generalizability of our findings to smaller mergers. 
 Furthermore, the cross-sectional nature of our merger sample complicates our efforts to 
establish causal relationships. Despite the use of an instrumental variables regression and the 
inclusion of a multitude of controls we cannot rule out that there are alternative explanations for 
our findings. For example, Cumming et al. (2016) show that market price manipulation around 
acquisitions has significant effects on completion rates and takeover premia. In order to rule out 
that certain merger or acquiror characteristics explain our results we employ an instrumental 
variable estimation using the manager’s past disclosure behavior as instrument. However, to the 
extent that manipulative behavior is correlated with disclosure behavior at and before merger 
announcements this might explain some of our findings. We cannot rule out that manipulative 
behavior or other unobserved systematic characteristics of the managers or companies in our 
sample are correlated with their prior forecasting behavior and also affect merger outcomes 
confounding our results. 
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7. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we examine the benefits and costs of pro-forma earnings forecasts in mergers and 
acquisitions, which we label merger forecasts. We show that merger forecasts, particularly in stock-
financed acquisitions, enhance the likelihood of merger completion and shorten the time to 
completion. Notably, such forecasts seem to persuade target shareholders to accept lower bid 
premia. In further tests we find that these forecasts, in particular quantitative forecasts, also affect 
analyst perceptions by increasing the likelihood that analysts revise their forecasts for the bidder 
upward. Our findings are consistent with the notion that merger forecasts are means for bidders 
affect the market’s perception of the proposed acquisition and in particular to persuade target 
shareholders to accept the bidder’s stock as payment.  
However, we further find that the benefits of forecasting only accrue to bidders that have 
built a strong forecasting reputation prior to the merger, suggesting that target shareholders infer 
the credibility of these forecasts from the bidders’ prior forecasting reputation. Given these benefits 
of merger forecasts, why don’t all bidders release forecasts? We show that there are considerable 
costs to merger forecasting for bidders with a weak forecasting credibility: Primarily, merger 
forecasts enhance the litigation exposure and the likelihood of management turnover post-
acquisition, particularly when the combined firm performs poorly post-merger.  
Our results are robust to an identification strategy that uses the bidder’s general disclosure 
behavior prior to the merger as well as the disclosure behavior of the bidder’s peer firms as 
exogenous instrument. The results are also robust to controlling for other confounding qualitative 
and quantitative information disclosed to shareholders in merger documents. Overall, in this paper 
we provide new and systematic evidence on the benefits and costs of pro-forma earnings forecasts 
in mergers and acquisitions.     
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APPENDIX A1– Variable Definitions 
ACCURACY Indicator variable equal to 1 if 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 < 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 , with 
𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑖 =  
1
𝑡
∑ 𝑎𝑏𝑠(𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡)
𝑡−1
𝑡−4 , where i stands for management 
or analyst consensus and t is measured in years prior to the acquisition announcement. 
BIAS Indicator variable equal to 1 if 𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 < 𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 , with 𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑖 =
 
1
𝑡
∑ (𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡)
𝑡−1
𝑡−4 , where i stands for management or analyst consensus 
and t is measured in years prior to the acquisition announcement. 
COMPETITION Indicator variable equal to 1 if target received rival bid from at least one other third 
party other than the bidder, 0 otherwise. 
COMPLETION Indicator variable equal to 1 if acquisition consummated, 0 if withdrawn/ cancelled. 
CONSENSUS_UPGRADE Indicator variable equal to 1 if analyst consensus EPS estimates after the acquisition 
announcement are higher than consensus estimates before the acquisition 
announcement, and zero otherwise. 
CONSISTENCY Indicator variable equal to 1 if 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 < 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 , with  
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖 =  √∑ [(𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡) −
1
𝑡
∑ (𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡)
𝑡−1
𝑡−4 ]
2
𝑡−1
𝑡−4 , 
where i stands for management or analyst consensus and t is measured in years prior 
to the acquisition announcement. 
CREDIBILITY Sum of ACCURACY + BIAS + CONSISTENCY 
DURATION Number of days from announcement date to completion date weighted by deal value. 
EPS_GROWTH Quintile rank divided by five of percent growth of pro-forma EPS for the fiscal year 
after the acquisition compared to actual EPS at fiscal year-end in the year prior to the 
acquisition.  
FOCUS Indicator variable equal to 1 if acquisition in the same 12 Fama-French industry, 0 
otherwise. 
FORECAST Indicator variable equal to 1 if the bidder disclosed earnings forecast for the 
acquisition, 0 otherwise. 
FUTURE Number of forward-looking words divided by the total number of words. 
GUIDANCE 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the bidder has provided earnings guidance during the 
previous fiscal year prior to the acquisition, 0 otherwise. 
LITIGATION Indictor variable equal to 1 if the bidder is involved in a shareholder lawsuit related to 
the acquisition within three years of the acquisition. 
LITIGIOUS Indicator variable equal to 1 if the bidding firm belongs to biotechnology, computers, 
and retail industries and 0 otherwise based on Francis et al. (1994) findings that these 
industries have higher litigation risk. 
NEGPOST Indicator variable equal to 1 if buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) measured from 
one month before merger completion to 24 months post-merger completion (-1, +24) 
are negative. BHARs are estimated using the Fama-French-Momentum four factor 
model.  
PAST Indicator variable equal to 1 if the bidder has disclosed earnings forecasts in 
acquisitions of similar size in the past, 0 otherwise. 
PEERGUIDANCE Percentage of firms in the same two-digit SIC industry as the bidding firm that 
disclosed annual earnings guidance for the full fiscal year prior to the acquisition 
announcement. 
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POSTBHAR Buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) measured from one month before merger 
completion to 24 months post-merger completion (-1, +24). BHARs are estimated 
using the Fama-French-Momentum four factor model. 
PREDISPOSITION Sum of the indicator variables GUIDANCE, PAST and REGULATION. Takes values 
of 0 (if none of the indicator variables is switched on, 1, 2, or 3 (if all of the indicator 
variables are switched on). 
PREDISPOSITION_ALT Residuals from the OLS regression of PREDISPOSITION on ACCURACY, BIAS, and 
CONSISTENCY.  
PREMIUM Offer premium measured as the natural logarithm of the difference between the offer 
price per share and the target’s share price one week before the acquisition 
announcement winsorized at the 0.01 level. 
PROFORMA_EPS Pro-forma earnings per share forecast at announcement for combined firms full fiscal 
year after completion 
QUANTITATIVE Indicator variable equal to 1 if a quantitative forecast is disclosed and zero if a 
qualitative forecast is disclosed. 
REGULATION Indicator variable equal to 1 if the acquisition occurred after the introduction of 
Regulation M-A and Regulation Fair Disclosure in the year 2000, zero otherwise. 
REVISED PREMIUM The difference between the final premium at closing in percent minus the initial 
premium at announcement in percent 
RIVAL BID Indicator variable equal to 1 if there is a competing bidder, zero otherwise 
SERIAL Indicator variable equal to 1 if bidder has been involved in at least one acquisition in 
the past  
SIZE Relative size of acquirer to target measured by the ratio of the logarithm of market 
value of acquirer to that of the target. 
SOX Indicator variable equal to 1 if the acquisition occurred after the introduction of 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, 0 otherwise. 
STOCK Indicator variable equal to 1 if the consideration paid included stock, 0 for all cash 
bids. 
SYNERGIES Indicator variable equal to 1 if the bidder discloses synergy estimates for the 
acquisition, 0 otherwise. 
TENDER Indicator variable equal to 1 if tender offer, 0 otherwise. 
TERMFEE Indicator variable equal to 1 if a either the bidder or the target have a termination fee 
in place, 0 otherwise. 
TOEHOLD Indicator variable equal to 1 if the bidder has an equity stake in the target prior to the 
acquisition, 0 otherwise. 
TONE Number of positive words minus number of negative words divided by the total 
number of words. 
VOLATILITY Pre-merger earnings volatility measured as the variance of annual changes in EBIT. 
WORDS Natural logarithm of the number of words in the S-4 filing  
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APPENDIX A2 – Factiva and Capital IQ search algorithms 
Pro-forma earnings forecasts  
We employed several keyword searches of news announcements on Factiva and of regulatory 
filings on Capital IQ for the collection of the earnings estimates for the acquisitions using as search 
period one day before date of announcement of the transaction until the date of completion or 
withdrawal provided by SDC. We then, first, examined every article that Factiva retrieved for each 
transaction based on our search criteria beginning with the oldest and noted whether a forecast was 
made, what type of forecast was made (quantitative or qualitative), whether positive or negative 
(i.e., EPS accretion or dilution), and in the case of quantitative forecasts the estimated EPS for the 
merger year and one or two years after (if available). In the second step we repeated the search for 
the same keywords in Capital IQ.  In particular, we used the following keywords, keyword parts 
or combinations thereof in both searches: Bidder name [AND target name] AND (earnings OR 
EPS OR income OR profit) AND (accretive OR accretion OR additive OR add OR positive OR 
increase OR contribute OR dilutive OR dilution OR decline OR negative OR decrease OR neutral 
OR impact). In Factiva we included the following sources in our search algorithm: Bloomberg 
website, CQ FD Disclosure (formerly Voxant FD Disclosure), which includes conference call 
transcripts (starts from 2002), Dow Jones News Services, Financial Times, Reuters News, The Wall 
Street Journal. And in Capital IQ the following sources were included: Current event disclosures 
(8-k), proxy statements (DEF 14A, PREM 14A), tender offer notices (SC TO, SC 14D9C) and 
prospectuses (S-4). 
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
Panel A: Sample characteristics  (in US$ million except for 
ratios)                 
  Mean   Median   Max   Min   
Std. 
Dev. 
Market value - bidder 28,457   8,108   397,234   52.33   51,348 
Market value - target 5,940   1,999   120,022   1.18   11,605 
Total assets - bidder 46,347   10,752   1,715,746   5.51   136,767 
Total assets - target 12,339   2,434   1,020,050   2.15   51,769 
Sales - bidder 16,070   5,438   425,071   2.15   29,275 
Sales- target 4,217   1,370   65,968   2.46   8,085 
Market to book ratio- bidder 4.40   2.58   46.69   0.63   6.62 
Market to book - target 4.24   2.39   45.34   0.36   6.61 
Deal value incl. Net debt (US$ mil) 7,879   3,140   191,328   204   15,280 
Deal value to EBIT 32.53   15.26   1,286.58   0.43   91.57 
Premium (%) 31.30   28.69   164.37   -27.44   26.56 
Relative size bidder to target 1.28   1.10   52.23   0.41   1.73 
Panel B: Deal characteristics by forecast                   
  Forecast   
No 
forecast   Diff (t-stat)         
Deal size (US$ million) 8,889   5,010   4.95***         
Cash only (%) 0.314   0.488    -5.24***         
Stock only (%) 0.263   0.244        0.63         
Mixed (%) 0.425   0.268   5.07***         
Completion (%) 0.860   0.651   6.92***         
Competition (%) 0.115   0.203   -3.43***         
Hostile (%) 0.035   0.081   -2.72***         
Premium (%) 31.22   31.50       -0.14         
                    
This table presents summary statistics for a sample of U.S. acquisition bids from 1990-2017. The t-statistics are provided in the 
right-hand column based on two-sided t-tests of means with unequal variances. The symbols ***, **, * denote statistical 
significance at p<0.01, p<0.05, p<0.1 levels, respectively.    
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Table 2: Correlations 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 FORECAST   0.15* 0.16* 0.03 -0.06 -0.01 -0.11* -0.05 -0.09* -0.20* 0.18* 0.35* 0.01 
2 STOCK 0.12*   -0.01 -0.17* -0.06 -0.34* -0.02 -0.12* -0.10* 0.01 0.02 0.25* -0.11* 
3 FOCUS 0.16* -0.04   0.09* -0.04 0.04 -0.22* 0.00 -0.05 -0.14* 0.32* 0.11* 0.21* 
4 LITIGIOUS 0.05  -0.17* 0.09*   0.02 0.24* -0.06 0.12* 0.00 -0.05 0.18* -0.10* 0.09* 
5 VOLATILITY -0.04  -0.13* 0.00 0.10*   -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.04 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.30* 
6 TENDER 0.03  -0.35* 0.06 0.23* 0.04   0.08 0.15* 0.02 0.06 0.02 -0.13* 0.02 
7 COMPETITION -0.11* 0.00  -0.20* -0.06 0.04 0.07   0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.16* -0.04 -0.10* 
8 PREMIUM 0.017 -0.16* -0.05 0.14* 0.10* 0.14* 0.12*   0.17* -0.02 0.02 -0.07 0.05 
9 SIZE -0.05 -0.36* 0.12* 0.22* 0.31* 0.27* -0.09* 0.20*   0.11* -0.01 -0.07 0.01 
10 TOEHOLD  -0.19* 0.01  -0.15* -0.05 -0.01 0.04 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04   -0.17* -0.13* 0.01 
11 TERMFEE 0.18* 0.02 0.32* 0.17* 0.06 0.02 -0.14* -0.01 0.16* -0.18*   0.13*  0.10* 
12 SYNERGIES 0.34* 0.23* 0.11* -0.10* -0.02 -0.11* -0.02 -0.08 -0.21* -0.13* 0.16*   -0.03 
13 SERIAL 0.01 -0.09* 0.22* 0.09* 0.41* 0.02 -0.10* 0.03 0.22* 0.01 0.08* -0.03   
This table presents Spearman correlations (left of the diagonal) and Pearson correlations (right of the diagonal) between the independent variables. * denotes statistical 
significance at p<0.05. 
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Table 3: The Effect of Forecast Disclosure on Acquisition Completion and Duration 
  ALL   PAYMENT   CREDIBILITY 
  COMPLETION FORECAST DURATION QUANT   STOCK   CASH   STRONG   WEAK 
FORECAST 1.879   -0.036 0.804   1.492   0.307   1.727   -0.931 
  (7.49)***   (-2.21)** (4.95)***   (3.14)***   (0.15)   (6.72)***   (-8.67)*** 
PREDISPOSITION   0.395                     
    (4.35)***                     
STOCK -0.241 0.207 0.006 -0.303           -0.088   0.116 
  (-2.03)** (1.76)* (0.95) (-1.63)           (-0.48)   (1.03) 
FOCUS -0.365 0.211 0.010 -0.294   -0.167   -0.467   -0.348   -0.281 
  (-2.44)** (1.41) (1.19) (-1.23)   (-0.85)   (-1.30)   (-1.79)*   (-2.35)** 
LITIGIOUS 0.307 -0.314 -0.010 0.250   0.493   -1.003   0.134   0.035 
  (1.59) (-1.53) (-0.97) (1.06)   (1.87)*   (-1.79)*   (0.43)   (0.28) 
VOLATILITY 0.085 -0.043 -0.004 0.091   0.038   0.321   0.141   0.046 
  (3.22)*** (-2.52)** (-4.69)*** (2.23)**   (1.25)   (2.46)**   (2.36)**   (2.24)** 
TENDER 0.016 0.404 -0.013 0.054   0.075   0.581   -0.458   0.403 
  (0.10) (2.57)** (-1.55) (0.24)   (0.26)   (1.79)*   (-1.83)*   (2.44)** 
COMPETITION -0.491 -0.401 0.003 -0.663   -0.659   -0.747   -0.015   -0.761 
  (-3.20)*** (-2.69)*** (0.30) (-3.34)***   (-3.09)***   (-1.98)**   (-0.07)   (-4.61)*** 
PREMIUM -0.005 0.004 0.000 -0.006   -0.006   -0.002   0.000   -0.003 
  (-3.02)*** (1.95)* (1.14) (-2.61)***   (-2.29)**   (-0.32)   (0.11)   (-1.47) 
SIZE 0.701 -0.393 -0.000 0.922   0.499   1.296   0.686   0.714 
  (2.76)*** (-2.64)*** (-0.28) (2.01)**   (1.37)   (1.14)   (2.06)**   (2.19)** 
TOEHOLD 0.393 -0.556 0.003 0.511   0.943   -1.366   0.538   -0.361 
  (1.79)* (-2.63)*** (0.23) (1.40)   (2.98)***   (-2.17)**   (1.72)*   (-1.42) 
TERMFEE 0.892 0.200 0.000 0.913   0.986   1.306   0.661   0.925 
  (6.80)*** (1.63) (0.06) (5.51)***   (5.50)***   (3.04)***   (3.31)***   (8.05)*** 
SYNERGIES 0.305 1.003 -0.001 0.327   0.586   1.102   0.594   0.775 
  (2.06)** (8.03)*** (-0.22) (2.04)**   (2.90)***   (1.33)   (2.66)***   (5.88)*** 
SERIAL 0.197 -0.329 -0.007 -0.060   0.125   -0.053   0.271   -0.134 
  (1.65)* (-2.28)** (-1.16) (-0.39)   (0.78)   (-0.17)   (1.46)   (-1.12) 
                         
             (Continued) 
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    Table 3 – cont.         
             
dy/dx(FORECAST) 0.357   -0.014 0.134   0.279   0.048   0.336   -0.215 
  (7.48)***   (-2.21)** (5.37)***   (3.16)***   (0.02)   (6.69)***   (-7.93)*** 
                          
Observations 1,000 1,000 798 713   614   366   383   593 
Prob > Chi2 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001   <0.001   <0.001   <0.001   <0.001 
The table presents results of multivariate probit full-information maximum likelihood (treatment effects) estimations on acquisition completion (duration) for a 
sample of U.S. acquisition bids from 1990-2017. The first set of columns (ALL) presents the results for the entire sample where the left two columns show the 
results of the outcome equation (dependent variable: COMPLETION) and the results of the selection equation (dependent variable: FORECAST). The selection 
equation results are suppressed for all following regressions. The next two columns show the results of the treatment effects regression of DURATION and the 
column under the heading QUANT shows the probit regression results of quantitative forecasts conditional on a forecast being disclosed. The second set of columns 
shows the results of the outcome equations (dependent variable: COMPLETION) by PAYMENT and the third set of columns shows the results of the outcome 
regressions by CREDIBILITY. The outcome regressions exclude the instrument PREDISPOSITION. Marginal effects of FORECAST are evaluated at the mean. All 
regressions include industry and year fixed effects. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Heteroskedasticity robust z-statistics are reported in parentheses. The 
symbols ***, **, * denote statistical significance at p<0.01, p<0.05, p<0.1 levels, respectively.
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Table 4: The Effect of Forecast Disclosure on Acquisition Premium 
 
  ALL   PAYMENT   CREDIBILITY 
  PREMIUM FORECAST QUANT   STOCK   CASH   STRONG   WEAK 
                        
FORECAST -0.412   0.101   -0.395   -0.448   -0.399   -0.049 
  (-2.01)**   (1.06)   (-1.68)*   (-1.53)   (-1.22)   (-0.40) 
PREDISPOSITION   0.569                   
    (5.08)***                   
STOCK -0.247 0.174 -0.280           -0.119   -0.245 
  (-2.74)*** (1.18) (-2.57)**           (-0.61)   (-2.57)** 
FOCUS -0.104 0.181 -0.019   -0.038   -0.152   -0.053   -0.289 
  (-0.85) (0.97) (-0.13)   (-0.28)   (-0.68)   (-0.29)   (-1.64) 
LITIGIOUS 0.485 -0.406 0.464   0.261   0.350   0.337   0.548 
  (3.82)*** (-1.51) (3.05)***   (2.10)**   (2.45)**   (1.33)   (4.05)*** 
VOLATILITY 0.009 -0.057 0.008   0.017   0.004   0.014   0.000 
  (0.73) (-3.12)*** (0.78)   (1.12)   (0.20)   (0.50)   (0.03) 
TENDER 0.156 0.283 0.136   0.239   0.087   0.273   0.115 
  (1.44) (1.50) (1.29)   (0.97)   (0.82)   (1.28)   (0.99) 
COMPETITION 0.299 -0.267 0.186   0.364   0.023   0.333   0.309 
  (2.31)** (-1.28) (1.49)   (2.21)**   (0.11)   (1.48)   (2.01)** 
SIZE 0.041 -0.459 0.346   0.486   0.141   0.033   0.155 
  (2.37)** (-2.99)*** (1.81)*   (2.12)**   (3.14)***   (1.51)   (3.30)*** 
TOEHOLD -0.421 -0.749 -0.654   -0.492   -0.351   -0.553   -0.198 
  (-2.20)** (-2.79)*** (-1.70)*   
(-
2.02)**   (-1.14)   (-1.86)*   (-0.83) 
TERMFEE 0.107 -0.177 -0.107   0.148   -0.124   -0.016   0.291 
  (1.05) (-1.04) (-0.92)   (1.15)   (-0.80)   (-0.09)   (2.50)** 
SYNERGIES 0.030 0.907 -0.062   0.034   0.061   -0.045   0.010 
  (0.35) (6.50)*** (-0.67)   (0.30)   (0.43)   (-0.28)   (0.12) 
SERIAL 0.020 -0.558 0.027   0.074   -0.018   -0.169   0.123 
  (0.25) (-3.23)*** (0.33)   (0.70)   (-0.16)   (-1.09)   (1.44) 
                        
Observations 806 806 545   497   280   310   488 
Prob > Chi2 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001   <0.001   <0.001   <0.001   <0.001 
This table presents results of treatment effects regressions on the acquisition premium for a sample of U.S. acquisition bids from 
1990-2017. The first set of columns (ALL) presents the results for the entire sample where the first column shows the results of the 
outcome equation (dependent variable: PREMIUM) and the second column the results of the selection equation (dependent 
variable: FORECAST). The selection equation results are suppressed for all following regressions. The third column under ALL 
shows the results of the OLS regression of PREMIUM on QUANTITATIVE. The second set of columns shows the results of the 
outcome equations by PAYMENT and the third set of columns shows the results of the outcome regressions by CREDIBILITY. 
The outcome regressions exclude the instrument PREDISPOSITION. All regressions control for industry and year fixed effects. 
All variables are defined in the Appendix. Heteroskedasticity robust z-statistics are reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, 
* denote statistical significance at p<0.01, p<0.05, p<0.1 levels, respectively. 
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Table 5: Revised Premium & Rival Bids 
  
REVISED 
PREMIUM   RIVAL BID 
            
FORECAST -7.438     -1.064   
  (-7.77)***     (-2.08)**   
EPS_GROWTH   2.660     0.572 
    (2.07)**     (1.44) 
            
            
CONTROLS YES YES   YES YES 
Observations 798 284   798 320 
Prob > Chi2 <0.001 <0.001   <0.001 <0.001 
This table presents results of treatment-effects regressions of the change in the acquisition 
premium (REVISED PREMIUM) in column 1 and of multivariate probit full-information 
maximum likelihood estimations of existence of a rival bid (RIVAL BID) in column 3 for a 
sample of U.S. acquisition bids from 1990-2017. Results of the selection equation that 
include the instrument PREDISPOSITION have been suppressed. Columns 2 and 4 show 
OLS and probit regression results, respectively. All regressions include the same control 
variables as in the previous tables. All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
Heteroskedasticity robust z-statistics are reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * 
denote statistical significance at p<0.01, p<0.05, p<0.1 levels, respectively. 
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Table 6: The Effect of Forecast Disclosure on Post-Acquisition Litigation 
 ALL   PAYMENT   CREDIBILITY 
  LITIGATION FORECAST QUANT   STOCK   CASH   STRONG   WEAK 
                        
FORECAST 0.686   -0.012   1.237   -1.773   -1.554   0.218 
  (1.38)   (-0.08)   (9.06)***   (-7.20)***   (-6.80)***   (0.33) 
PREDISPOSITION   0.591                   
    (5.26)***                   
STOCK 0.032 0.218 0.024           0.030   0.008 
  (0.19) (1.46) (0.14)           (0.10)   (0.04) 
FOCUS 0.072 0.178 0.026   -0.136   0.884   0.253   0.160 
  (0.36) (0.96) (0.12)   (-0.76)   (1.01)   (0.88)   (0.46) 
LITIGIOUS 0.826 -0.371 0.774   0.625   0.775   1.791   0.776 
  (3.57)*** (-1.43) (2.99)***   (2.28)**   (1.84)*   (3.16)***   (2.59)*** 
VOLATILITY -0.000 -0.057 -0.017   0.012   -0.036   -0.060   0.002 
  (-0.00) (-3.09)*** (-0.66)   (0.60)   (-0.83)   (-1.45)   (0.06) 
TENDER -0.002 0.254 0.088   -0.495   0.326   0.432   0.342 
  (-0.01) (1.35) (0.37)   (-1.19)   (1.22)   (1.15)   (1.29) 
COMPETITION 0.087 -0.229 -0.108   0.108   0.138   -0.299   0.025 
  (0.41) (-1.07) (-0.45)   (0.47)   (0.31)   (-0.85)   (0.08) 
PREMIUM -0.002 0.002 -0.000   0.002   -0.002   -0.002   -0.003 
  (-1.06) (1.05) (-0.09)   (0.61)   (-0.49)   (-0.36)   (-0.82) 
SIZE 0.008 -0.430 -0.015   0.040   -0.283   -0.077   -0.196 
  (0.18) (-2.84)*** (-0.08)   (0.58)   (-0.68)   (-0.21)   (-0.58) 
TOEHOLD 0.043 -0.655 -0.338   0.112       -0.316     
  (0.10) (-2.42)** (-0.66)   (0.29)       (-0.64)     
TERMFEE 0.145 -0.123 0.127   -0.267   1.989   -0.189   0.100 
  (0.82) (-0.72) (0.62)   (-1.70)*   (3.20)***   (-0.63)   (0.39) 
SYNERGIES -0.280 0.927 -0.043   -0.358   0.300   0.160   -0.095 
  (-1.45) (6.54)*** (-0.26)   (-2.47)**   (0.99)   (0.60)   (-0.36) 
SERIAL 0.149 -0.568 0.186   0.117   -0.029   0.344   0.220 
  (1.03) (-3.26)*** (1.12)   (0.74)   (-0.10)   (1.40)   (1.11) 
                        
dy/dx(FORECAST) 0.139       0.281   -0.390   -0.362   0.043 
  (1.29)       (8.13)***   (-7.12)***   (-7.23)***   ( 0.31 ) 
                        
Observations 798 798 479   473   296   284   474 
Prob > Chi2 <0.001 <0.001 0.032   <0.001   <0.001   <0.001   <0.001 
This table presents results of multivariate probit full-information maximum likelihood estimations on litigation likelihood for a sample of U.S. acquisition 
bids from 1990-2017. The sample is conditioned on completed mergers. The first set of columns (ALL) presents the results for the entire sample where 
the left two columns show the results of the outcome equation (dependent variable: LITIGATION) and the results of the selection equation (dependent 
variable: FORECAST). The selection equation results are suppressed for all following regressions. The column under the heading QUANT shows the 
probit regression results of quantitative forecasts conditional on a forecast being disclosed. The second set of columns shows the results of the outcome 
equations (dependent variable: LITIGATION) by PAYMENT and the third set of columns shows the results of the outcome regressions by 
CREDIBILITY. The outcome regressions exclude the instrument PREDISPOSITION. Marginal effects of FORECAST are evaluated at the mean. All 
regressions include industry and year fixed effects. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Heteroskedasticity robust z-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * denote statistical significance at p<0.01, p<0.05, p<0.1 levels, respectively.  
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Table 7: The Effect of Forecast Disclosure on CEO Turnover 
  ALL   PAYMENT   CREDIBILITY 
  TURNOVER FORECAST QUANT   STOCK   CASH   STRONG   WEAK 
                        
FORECAST 0.949   -0.297   1.204   -1.409   -1.380   2.085 
  (1.50)   (-1.44)   (5.66)***   (-4.03)***   (-1.68)*   (4.07)*** 
PREDISPOSITION   0.534                   
    (4.51)***                   
STOCK 0.032 0.206 0.209           0.734   0.291 
  (0.12) (1.39) (0.80)           (2.00)**   (0.74) 
FOCUS 0.179 0.213 0.068   0.212   -0.068   0.399   0.001 
  (0.88) (1.11) (0.31)   (1.02)   (-0.17)   (1.54)   (0.00) 
LITIGIOUS 0.206 -0.421 0.029   -0.168   0.038   1.872   -0.427 
  (0.55) (-1.53) (0.08)   (-0.39)   (0.07)   (2.14)**   (-0.60) 
VOLATILITY -0.006 -0.054 -0.025   -0.002   -0.202   0.046   -0.045 
  (-0.21) (-2.93)*** (-0.84)   (-0.07)   (-1.36)   (1.06)   (-1.41) 
TENDER -0.135 0.261 -0.024   0.580   -0.573   0.045   0.010 
  (-0.38) (1.37) (-0.07)   (1.23)   (-1.06)   (0.09)   (0.02) 
COMPETITION -0.109 -0.237 -0.060   -0.173   0.028   0.296   -0.884 
  (-0.49) (-1.11) (-0.25)   (-0.75)   (0.06)   (0.85)   (-1.95)* 
PREMIUM -0.001 0.003 -0.002   -0.003   -0.030   0.008   -0.008 
  (-0.14) (1.29) (-0.41)   (-0.70)   (-1.68)*   (1.29)   (-1.36) 
SIZE -0.026 -0.435 -0.092   -0.066   -0.112   -0.738   -0.033 
  (-0.30) (-2.87)*** (-0.49)   (-0.90)   (-0.21)   (-1.32)   (-0.05) 
TOEHOLD 0.303 -0.725 -0.264   -0.434   0.644   -0.586   0.273 
  (0.74) (-2.65)*** (-0.52)   (-0.68)   (1.43)   (-1.00)   (0.52) 
TERMFEE 0.084 -0.163 -0.097   0.214   0.326   -0.108   -0.087 
  (0.42) (-0.96) (-0.45)   (1.09)   (1.34)   (-0.39)   (-0.30) 
SYNERGIES 0.207 0.959 0.217   0.237   0.706   0.912   -0.641 
  (0.67) (6.65)*** (0.88)   (0.99)   (1.57)   (3.02)***   (-1.89)* 
SERIAL 0.487 -0.515 0.435   0.346   0.357   0.118   0.811 
  (2.11)** (-2.88)*** (1.78)*   (1.39)   (0.88)   (0.37)   (2.27)** 
                        
dy/dx(FORECAST) 0.124       0.208   -0.310   -0.328   0.449 
  (0.14)       ( 5.69)***   (-3.75)***   (-1.65)*   (4.91)*** 
                        
Observations 798 798 798   474   304   307   461 
Prob > Chi2 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001   <0.001   <0.001   <0.001   <0.001 
This table presents results of multivariate probit full-information maximum likelihood estimations on CEO turnover for a sample of U.S. acquisition 
bids from 1990-2017. The sample is conditioned on completed mergers. The first set of columns (ALL) presents the results for the entire sample 
where the left two columns show the results of the outcome equation (dependent variable: LITIGATION) and the results of the selection equation 
(dependent variable: FORECAST). The selection equation results are suppressed for all following regressions. The column under the heading 
QUANT shows the probit regression results of quantitative forecasts conditional on a forecast being disclosed. The second set of columns shows the 
results of the outcome equations (dependent variable: LITIGATION) by PAYMENT and the third set of columns shows the results of the outcome 
regressions by CREDIBILITY. The outcome regressions exclude the instrument PREDISPOSITION. Marginal effects of FORECAST are evaluated 
at the mean. All regressions include industry and year fixed effects. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Heteroskedasticity robust z-statistics 
are reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * denote statistical significance at p<0.01, p<0.05, p<0.1 levels, respectively.  
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Table 8: Post-Merger Performance and Costs of Disclosure 
  LITIGATION   TURNOVER 
                
FORECAST 0.218   0.551   1.247   0.017 
  (0.37)   (1.01)   (1.59)   (0.01) 
NEGPOST -0.533       0.612     
  (-2.02)**       (1.48)     
FORECAST ×  NEGPOST  0.808       -0.386     
  (2.73)***       (-0.88)     
POSTCAR     1.069       -0.870 
      (2.31)**       (-0.93) 
FORECAST ×  POSTBHAR     -1.976       0.553 
      (-3.74)***       (0.55) 
                
CONTROLS YES   YES   YES   YES 
Observations 798   798   798   798 
Prob > Chi2 <0.001   <0.001   <0.001   <0.001 
This table presents results of multivariate probit full-information maximum likelihood estimations 
of litigation likelihood and CEO turnover for a sample of U.S. acquisition bids from 1990-2017. The 
sample is conditioned on completed mergers. The first pair of columns (LITIGATION) presents the 
results of the outcome equation with the dependent variable LITIGATION and the second pair of 
columns (TURNOVER) presents the results of the outcome equation with the dependent variable 
TURNOVER. The results of the selection equation (dependent variable: FORECAST) are 
suppressed for ease of exposition. The outcome regressions exclude the instrument 
PREDISPOSITION. All regressions include the same control variables as in the previous tables as 
well as industry and year fixed effects. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Heteroskedasticity 
robust z-statistics are reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * denote statistical significance 
at p<0.01, p<0.05, p<0.1 levels, respectively.  
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Table 9: Quantitative Forecasts and Analyst Reactions 
Panel A: Forecast errors 
  FORECAST ERROR (N=365) 
  Scaled by price  Scaled by actual 
        
MANAGEMENT -0.008   0.540 
  (-1.07)   (3.58)*** 
CONSENSUS 0.004   0.485 
  (3.09)***   (3.61)*** 
        
DIFFERENCE -0.012   0.055 
  (1.52)   (0.71) 
Panel B: Analyst reactions 
        
  CONSENSUS UPGRADE 
        
FORECAST 1.833     
  (5.28)***     
PROFORMA_EPS     0.100 
      (2.61)*** 
        
dy/dx(FORECAST) 0.507   0.028 
  (7.01)***   (2.69)*** 
        
CONTROLS YES   YES 
Observations 1,000   221 
Prob > Chi2 0.027   0.027 
Panel A presents univariate results of forecast errors for a sample of 
quantitative forecasts in U.S. acquisition bids from 1990-2017. Forecast 
errors are calculated as forecast minus actual scaled by the share price at 
the prior fiscal year end (column on the left) and by the absolute value of 
the actual (column on the right. Panel B shows results of multivariate 
probit full-information maximum likelihood estimations (column on the 
left) of CONSENSUS_UPGRADE. The results of the selection equation 
(dependent variable: FORECAST) are suppressed for ease of exposition. 
The outcome regressions excludes the instrument PREDISPOSITION. 
The column on the right shows results of probit regressions conditional 
on a quantitative forecast being disclosed All regressions include the 
same control variables as in the previous tables. Heteroskedasticity robust 
z-statistics are reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * denote 
statistical significance at p<0.01, p<0.05, p<0.1 levels, respectively. 
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Table 11: Confounding Information  
  COMPLETION   DURATION   PREMIUM 
  OUTCOME SELECTION   OUTCOME SELECTION  OUTCOME SELECTION 
                  
FORECAST 1.800     -0.035     -0.529   
  (5.62)***     (-1.57)     (-2.38)**   
PREDISPOSITION   0.416     0.490     0.473 
    (3.66)***     (3.58)***     (3.54)*** 
WORDS 0.064 -0.041   -0.007 -0.114   -0.128 -0.133 
  (0.67) (-0.44)   (-1.25) (-0.97)   (-1.99)** (-1.16) 
FORWARD-
LOOKING -0.379 0.174   -0.019 0.248   -0.116 0.329 
  (-1.73)* (0.77)   (-1.51) (0.92)   (-0.77) (1.25) 
TONE 0.108 -0.023   -0.017 -0.218   -0.196 -0.211 
  (0.49) (-0.11)   (-1.51) (-0.88)   (-1.53) (-0.86) 
                  
Controls Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Observations 754 754   621 621   625 625 
Prob > Chi2 <0.001 <0.001   <0.001 <0.001   <0.001 <0.001 
This table presents results of multivariate probit full-information maximum likelihood and treatment effects estimations for 
acquisition completion, duration and premium for a sample of U.S. acquisition bids from 1990-2017. The first set of columns 
(COMPLETION) show the results of the outcome equation (dependent variable: COMPLETION) and the results of the selection 
equation (dependent variable: FORECAST). The next two columns show the results of the treatment effects regression of 
DURATION and the third set of columns the results of the treatment effects regression of PREMIUM. The outcome regressions 
exclude the instrument PREDISPOSITION. Marginal effects of FORECAST are evaluated at the mean. All regressions include 
industry and year fixed effects. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Heteroskedasticity robust z-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * denote statistical significance at p<0.01, p<0.05, p<0.1 levels, respectively. 
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Table 11: Alternative Instruments 
Panel A: Alternative instrument = INNATE   
  COMPLETION DURATION PREMIUM LITIGATION TURNOVER 
  Outcome Selection Outcome Selection Outcome Selection Outcome Selection Outcome Selection 
                      
FORECAST 0.765   -0.057   -0.324   -0.003   1.535   
  (1.84)*   (-3.55)***   (-1.65)*   (-0.01)   (9.80)***   
INNATE   0.360   0.414   0.438   0.438   0.294 
    (3.57)***   (3.49)***   (3.67)***   (3.57)***   (2.46)** 
Observations 1,000 1,000 798 798 795 795 784 784 759 759 
Prob > Chi2 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Panel B: Alternative instrument = PEERGUIDANCE               
  COMPLETION DURATION PREMIUM LITIGATION TURNOVER 
  Outcome Selection Outcome Selection Outcome Selection Outcome Selection Outcome Selection 
                      
FORECAST 1.640   -0.026   -0.375   -0.702   1.672   
  (6.79)***   (-1.65)*   (-1.71)*   (-0.76)   (11.06)***   
PEERGUIDANCE   0.003   0.003   0.004   0.003   0.003 
    (2.81)***   (2.21)**   (3.16)***   (2.79)***   (1.29) 
Observations 1,000 1,000 798 798 806 806 798 798 798 798 
Prob > Chi2 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
This table present results of multivariate probit and treatment effects regressions of the completion likelihood, time to completion, acquisition premium, post-
acquisition litigation and CEO turnover in U.S. acquisition bids from 1990-2017. The columns report coefficients of the selection and outcome regressions 
on the respective dependent variables stated on top of each column, using two alternative instruments. Panel A summarizes the results using INNATE as 
instrument in the selection equation and Panel B summarizes the results using PEERGUIDANCE as instrument in the selection equation. Controls are the 
same as in our base line regressions in Tables 3-7. Coefficients on all other controls as well as industry and year fixed effects are suppressed. 
Heteroskedasticity robust z-statistics are reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * denote statistical significance at p<0.01, p<0.05, p<0.1 levels, 
respectively. 
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